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QUICK BROWSE CONTENT
- THE BEGINNINGS OF THE SPORT
- THE GAME CHANGES
- THE BIRTH OF GROUP B
- THE CARS (summary)
- THE DRIVERS (summary)
- THE TEAMS (summary)
- THE COMPETITION (summary)
- THE FALL OF GROUP B
- AN INFLUENCE FOR THE FUTURE
- AN IMMORTAL LEGACY
- REFERENCES / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE SPORT
The motorsport of rallying can trace its roots nearly as far back as the invention of the automobile itself. At its inception, since most cars were owned by the wealthy, rallies were “gentleman” events, aimed on navigation and endurance, with a simple goal to reach point A to B by using public roads. Long distance events were predominant and rewarded the most reliable cars. One of the most popular of the early era was the Rallye Monte Carlo that began in 1911. Since open public roads were used, the competitors had to obey all traffic laws, and as such could not exceed the average speed set by the officials. This type of navigational event was what rallying was all about for over 70 years.
THE NEED FOR SPEED – BIRTH OF THE WRC
Before the 1960s, rally cars were entirely privately owned, basic low-powered factory vehicles without roll cages, and with only minor modifications such as extra spare tire mounts and auxiliary lights. By then, many competitors felt like rallying shouldn’t be all about (slow) endurance and navigational skills and, even though the overall speeds were still limited, the trend slowly shifted towards using smaller, more nimble cars in hopes to gain an edge in the corners and get back any lost time along the way. The car that best personified the new evolving rally culture of the period was the Mini Cooper.
This “need for speed” eventually gave birth to the “special stage” rally format (closed public roads without speed limits) that rewarded performance over outright reliability. The new trend made the sport evolve very quickly in popularity. So much so that many automobile manufacturers then saw rallying as a very good opportunity to market their products. Many factory teams were created to compete in international yet locally-sanctioned competitions. This era of awakening came to be known as the “Golden Age” of rallying.
The immense popularity of the new performance-based format led the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) to create the World Rally Championship (WRC) in 1973. The FIA transferred control of its new series to its Commission Sportive Internationale (CSI) which was a self-governing committee in charge of all sporting codes in motor racing. The CSI used its existing sporting and homologation regulations to which all rally cars now had to abide to. The top rally class was “Group 4” (grand touring cars) which mandated the manufacturers to produce a minimum of 500 cars in 12 consecutive months (subsequently lowered to 400/24 in 1976) for the car to be accepted in competition. This was to ensure that rallying would remain a sport for widely available road cars as it had always been since its inception. As such, rally cars of the period were mostly production cars with some modifications aimed at increasing overall performance.
THE GAME CHANGES
One manufacturer would not let the homologation requirements get in the way of their vision of a true rally car: Lancia. They would design what is considered as the world’s very first purpose built rally car: the Stratos HF. Lancia had no concerns in producing the required amount of cars needed for Group 4 homologation as winning was more important to the image of the brand. The Stratos would dominate by winning the championship 3 years in a row (1974~76), prompting the CSI to change some rules to try and even out the field. However, the Lancia Stratos and its purposeful design gave ever more popularity to the sport, to which the CSI also took notice.
Another manufacturer would help shuffle the deck towards making purpose built rally cars a new benchmark: Renault. In the late 1970s, the French car maker had the idea to turn a basic front-engine and front-wheel drive economy car into a mid-engine and rear-wheel drive racer. Hence, the Renault 5 Turbo concept was born out of the wish to emulate the successes of the Lancia Stratos in rallying but without the need of starting from scratch. Officially homologated for Group 4 in 1980, the car got much success in rally competitions, especially on the French tarmac. It is considered as the best value rally car of its day. After the R5 Turbo’s immediate success, many other manufacturers were contemplating the very same “recipe” for their future rally designs.
In the later half of the 1970s, motorsport was evidently becoming a very popular and very lucrative affair, especially after the emergence into stardom of F1 under the Formula One Constructors Association (FOCA). In 1978, this led the CSI sporting code governing body to “flex its muscles” and appoint new members to its Executive Committee in hopes to retain full control of motor racing. One of these leading figures, albeit very controversial, was Jean-Marie Balestre; a founding member of the Fédération Française du Sport Automobile (FFSA), a French national motorsport organisation that debuted in 1950, and to which he was elected its president later in 1973. Five years forward, Balestre was elected president to the CSI and wasted no time in immediately transforming it into the Fédération Internationale du Sport Automobile (FISA). Balestre was well known for wanting things “his way” – and that would totally change the world of motorsport forever.
In 1979, the newly formed FISA agreed to the proposal of a previously unknown brand to the world of rallying, Audi, and legalised four-wheel drive for use in competition. At the time, almost everyone involved in the regulations didn’t believe that the complexity and extra weight of four-wheel drive could offset its traction advantage in a performance-oriented environment. However, not long after, Audi would surge to the forefront with their quattro four-wheel drive rally car and utterly began dominating slippery events by a large margin. However, the car achieved mitigated overall results since it was clunky on tarmac and somewhat unreliable. The quattro was therefore seen by its rival manufacturers as a mundane road car that was incapable of major success. Hence, four-wheel drive, although it had shown its unmistakable superiority in some events, was not yet seen as the ultimate future of rallying.
THE BIRTH OF GROUP B
At the end of the 1970s, the FISA invited the Bureau Permanent International des Constructeurs d’Automobiles (BPICA – an organisation created to represent the interests of the car manufacturers in motorsport) to help negotiate new regulations for its famous “Appendix J” (which dictated the rules for the cars). The clear consensus was the need to for more freedom and less “red tape”. However, to allow this, major alterations to the rule-book would be needed. A total revamp of all previous road car-based racing categories was proposed by regrouping them together into just three “groups”; A, B, and C. However, the FISA would make a last minute addition: Group N. The latter was to allow all “normal” (factory) widely produced cars to compete – to which manufacturers showed near zero interest for at the time. The new, simpler, “lettered” regulations were set to begin on January 1st 1982.
The specific intentions for Group B, which would directly replace Group 4 (and 5 to some extent), were to help lure more car manufacturers into motorsport (including rallying) by promising quicker car development, subsequent publicity opportunities, all without the need for an existing production model. In fact, only 200 homologation cars would now be needed to be manufactured in 12 months for it to be accepted in competition – hence effectively cutting in half the previous requirements of Group 4. In brief, this lower number was to favour top levels of performance at a much lower production cost.
In October of 1980, Group B was officially approved, but there was dissension within the FISA as to if the new category was to be allowed in the WRC and other international rally series. The first vote was not in favour (9 nays to 3 yeas). The main reason cited was that many countries whom hosted WRC events did not want “race cars” on their public roads. This decision sparked vivid reactions within the BPICA members and urged the FISA to reconsider. This was particularly true for Ford and Fiat (Lancia) since both had already started heavily investing to develop new rally cars for the category. Then came an event, from the unlikeliest of places, that would help shuffle the deck in favour of Group B rallying: the “FISA-FOCA war”.
The infamous battle between FISA’s Jean-Marie Balestre and FOCA’s Bernie Ecclestone revolved around the commercial aspects of Formula One and it had shown no sign of a quick resolution. This feud was a big concern for the FISA since F1 was the most popular and most investment-heavy motorsport series worldwide. If the war would persist for a long time it would seriously put the FISA’s very financial survival at risk. Then the FISA members remembered the big success story that the WRC had become in the previous years. The manufacturers that were already heavily invested in rallying were mostly different from those in F1 and convincing them to invest even more could be the FISA’s salvation. The matter was put back to a vote and Group B was accepted in all rallying competitions.
Hence, if not for the FISA-FOCA war, it is easy to argue that Group B in rallying would never have been made possible in the first place.
In May of 1981, some of the finer details of the Group B rallying category were still not yet set in stone, making members of the FISA doubt that there would be enough of a field of cars for its planned debut which was less than seven months away. As such, it was voted to let the previous Group 2 and 4 cars compete for the various 1982 rally championships and allow time for manufacturers to develop a car under the new regulations while still having a model that could compete in the interim. This transition feature also allowed privateers to continue competing with the cars they already owned. However, the FISA was adamant that by 1983 manufacturers would have to run Group B homologated cars with their seeded drivers to be able to score points.
However, most manufacturers were still not ready to fully embrace the new regulations and invest large sums of money to design new rally cars without some sort of guarantee that the FISA wouldn’t just change the rules again. To put that fear to rest, the FISA added a 5-year “stability” clause to ensure that the regulations would not change until December 31st 1987, and would not be cancelled unless a 2-year notice. Furthermore, manufacturers with Group 4 homologated cars of which the expiration date was not yet reached would be allowed to apply for a “transfer” into Group B (even if their rally cars would be identical to the previous version) and be eligible for points. These additions were able to put everyone’s minds at ease and Group B rallying was officially alive, again.
This all meant that, in less than two decades, performance rallying went from mundane low-powered factory road cars to purpose built high performance racing machines with manufacturer “works” teams now backed by millions of dollars. Thus, set for glory, Group B would change the world of rallying forever.
More information about the Group 4 transfers can be found by CLICKING HERE.
It is also note to mention that Group B wasn’t created exclusively for rallying. In fact, the FISA had anticipated that it would be used in circuit racing to replace the previous Group 4 Grand Touring cars and the “silhouette” Group 5 racers with the “evolution” (ET) feature. More information about why FISA Group B circuit racing did not really take off can be found by CLICKING HERE!
Much more frequently asked questions about Group B can be quickly answered in this F.A.Q. page!
THE GROUP B RALLY CARS
Group B had no restrictions on car design, exterior or interior dimensions, material composition of chassis or bodywork, drivetrain layout, engine type or size, or power output, but these general rules applied;
- The cabin had to fit two seats side by side and could not be open-roofed.
- Respect a minimum race weight calculated via engine displacement and forced induction factor.
- Respect a maximum tire width combination calculated via engine displacement and forced induction factor.
- All of the rest was mostly free minus very basic safety requirements.
Group B cars would then be divided into four sub-classes pertaining to their “final” (adjusted) engine displacement;
- B/12: 2000 cc +
- B/11: 1600~1999 cc
- B/10: 1300~1599 cc
- B/9: 1299 cc or less
The FISA mandated that forced induction engines using a turbo, supercharger or a combination of both would get a multiplication factor of 1.4 to calculate their adjusted engine displacement position. This would directly determine how little the car could weight and how wide of tires it could run.
As such, when building the cars, the Group B engineers had to approximate the race weight of their designs in harmony with the engine choice to properly set the cars up for the specific weight and tire classes. Not doing this correctly would handicap the car in one way or the other.
For a Group B car to be accepted in official competition, manufacturers had to produce a minimum of 200 units within a 12 month period. After completion, FISA officials would then be invited to physically count the cars. However, there was rumours that many manufacturers used various double counting schemes to fool the inspectors.
For the complete Group B homologation list, CLICK HERE!
In addition to the one-time batch of 200 homologation cars, the FISA introduced major revisions to the previous “Evolution” (E) feature, now called “Evolution / Termination” (ET) under Group B regulations. This would allow an additional 10% of the total number of cars produced to receive special modifications specifically for racing and was needed to homologate any “evolution” models into competition.
The new evolution “ET” rules were meant to somewhat control the old “VF/VO” (parts manufacturer variant / parts option variant) rules that the manufacturers exploited in Group 4 to greatly enhance the performance of a normal production road car. The main difference in the regulations was that any use of the “Evolution / Termination” feature meant that the production of the car model used for homologation had to be terminated.
For the FISA, this “termination” clause was seen as enough of a dissuasive measure for the manufacturers to reconsider using the evolution feature. However, it turned out that the FISA was deadly wrong as most manufacturers simply worked around it by producing 200 homologation cars that were branded as a different model or sub-model than the normal production car. For the most well funded teams this meant designing and producing a car entirely bespoke to win rallies, hence exploiting the loophole to the maximum – something that the FISA had not quite planned for!
To learn much more about the full rules and regulations of Group B, CLICK HERE!
-DEVELOPMENT TIMELINE (summary)
In 1980 (2 years before Group B), Audi had come along with the quattro and its revolutionary four-wheel drive system (4WD). However most rally teams, even if the quattro had gotten decent success, still preferred the classic rear-wheel drive (RWD) drivetrain layout. For Audi, the quattro was nonetheless their weapon of choice to tackle the new Group B competition.
4WD was thought to be too heavy, cumbersome, unreliable, and the system did originally turn out to be predominantly slower than RWD in tarmac rallies especially under dry conditions. In fact, this fault was what Lancia was betting on exploiting when launching the very first “supercar” built entirely to Group B specifications: the rear-wheel drive Rallye 037.
For the 1982 transition year, Group B cars started out rather humbly: except for the Audi, they were all RWD Group 4 cars that were simply carried over intact into the new regulations. Yet that year saw a very close battle between the Audi quattro and the Opel Ascona B 400, proving that conventional RWD platforms still had potential at the current design level. At this point in time most international rally cars “only” produced around 250~300 horsepower (BHP); tire, suspension, and limited-slip differential technologies couldn’t put any more power to the ground efficiently enough. That is when four-wheel drive really had the potential to shuffle the deck.
1983 saw the homologation of multiple legitimate Group B cars, like the Toyota Celica TCT and Opel Manta B 400, yet most of them remained only upgraded versions of the previous Group 4 cars that were still in production. The main difference between these older cars and their upgraded counterparts was with the use of lightweight composite materials. Otherwise, the cars remained mostly identical in their technical specifications. However, by this time, the models clinging to their conventional design became less and less competitive on the international scene.
Meanwhile, the Audi quattro got updated by use of composites panels (less weight), a wider track, and now produced over 350 BHP. Besides these improvements, the quattro’s four-wheel drive was not able to truly dominate its rear-wheel drive opponents but that was only a matter of refining the system further to increase reliability and outrun them with raw power. By this time, many manufacturers realised how deep the Group B regulations could be exploited and started frantically developing bespoke rally machines.
1984 would bring the game up a notch when Audi, in response to the fierce opposition in the works, launched the Sport quattro as their “proper” Group B car. It was a short-wheelbase version that featured an upgraded engine putting out 450 BHP (much more than any other competitor of the time). It was somewhat seen as a desperate attempt to push the quattro beyond its design limits and was not well received by the drivers. Audi Sport knew that the quattro’s days in Group B were numbered but were constrained to continue on this route by the company’s top executives.
Audi’s dominance in rallying effectively came to an end when Peugeot launched the four-wheel drive, turbocharged, 350 BHP, mid-engine, 205 Turbo 16 mid-season: a car that proved instantly superior to the more powerful quattro thanks to its purposeful design. By the end of 1984, the little Peugeot became the sport’s benchmark and seemed unbeatable. Its lightweight, turbocharged, mid-engine, and four-wheel drive design came to be universally known as “Group B’s winning formula”.
In 1985, even if Lancia did their best with the Rallye 037, rear-wheel drive rally cars were rendered obsolete in international special stage rallying. The “war” for domination was now fully concentrated between the four-wheel drive machines. Peugeot would soon up the ante with an even more powerful and aerodynamically stable version of their 205 T16 (E2). Audi responded by bumping the horsepower of their Sport quattro to nearly 600 BHP and adding wild aerodynamic enhancements (E2).
At the end of the year, Lancia launched the long awaited four-wheel drive, twin-charged, mid-engine, 450 BHP Delta S4 to replace the now technically outclassed Rallye 037. The S4 was immediately considered as the most technically advanced spaceframe (tubular chassis) and “function over form” rally car. The Delta S4 instantly became a major threat to Peugeot’s dominance and once again brought Lancia on top of the sport.
At the same time as the Lancia, MG launched the very diminutive, four-wheel drive, mid-engine, normally aspirated, 380 BHP Metro 6R4. The engineers had preferred a super compact design paired with a normally aspirated setup to keep engine response crisp for tight roads – a decision that was later highly criticised. Yet it remained one of the more affordable top Group B cars, especially for privateers, and was a very fierce national-level contender.
Early in 1986, Peugeot’s sister PSA company, Citroën, launched their own top-tier Group B effort with the four-wheel drive, turbocharged, front-engine, 380 BHP BX 4TC. However, the company’s decision to cling to an outmoded concept similar to Audi’s original recipe made the car turn out to be an immediate disappointment due to its larger size, heavier weight, horrid understeer issues, and overall poor performance. Records show that it had difficulty outpacing the best Group A cars in some rallies.
Ford, after an absence of six years in the WRC, came back with the four-wheel drive, turbocharged, mid-engine, 450 BHP RS200. While the car was very promising for Ford, featuring very advanced aluminium honeycomb construction techniques, it suffered from a “parts bin” design while not truly exploiting Group B’s lax rules to the maximum. This criticism came from the fact that, since the RS200 didn’t have to emulate an actual road going model, it could have been made even more purposeful. However, some insiders claim that the car had a potential greater than any of its competitors if enough development had been put in.
By 1986, the Group B horsepower war had reached its peak; in four short years the power output of the best rally cars had doubled, surging from 250~300 to 450~600 BHP, and most insiders agree that the claimed horsepower numbers of the manufacturers were in fact conservative. This officially classified them as “supercars” in every aspect. The potential of turbochargers was limited only by the engine’s ability to survive and cross the finish line.
Even more power was rumoured to be in the works; Markku Alèn later stated in an interview that the Lancia Delta S4 he was given for the 1986 Olympus Rally featured an upgraded engine that was tuned to produce “up to 750 BHP”. Audi was also reportedly working on a 1,000 BHP version of the Sport quattro for use in specific rallies.
In but a few years, rallying went from a “backwoods” motorsport (i.e. rally cars built in barns by privateers) to the forefront of automotive technological development to a level that rivalled any other type of racing. Group B car development, especially turbocharger output, had reached levels beyond any expectations from the FISA. The wild-looking, high-flying, fire-spitting Group B cars had earned their legendary status; they became to be regarded as the “off-road Formula 1s” with technology, engineering, horsepower, and aerodynamics to match. Multiple unfortunate events made the cars receive the nickname of “The Killer B’s”, which only added to the mythical status that still exists to this day. Sadly, 1986 would be the last and final season for the amazing WRC Group B cars. The period later came to be known as the “Golden Era” of rallying and has struck an undying fascination for these cars.
While the fire-breathing Group B/12 supercars gathered most of the attention and are responsible for the legendary fame behind Group B, they actually are but a small portion of the cars that got homologated! In fact, some lesser Group B classes actually were of lower performance than the best Group A cars.
It is a common oversight to forget the more humble B/9-10-11 small engine displacement classes that provided the low-powered, cheap to buy, entry-level cars with the same liberties for improvement as the B/12 “supercars”. If fully upgraded, these diminutive underdogs could be turned into giant killers. These classes however featured mostly privateer or dealership entries for use in national-level competition, hence were never developed to supercar status.
Detailed info on each Group B rally car can be found by CLICKING HERE!
While some say that the cars made Group B legendary, do not forget that you needed drivers capable of handling such raw machines. Compared with today, there was no high-tech electronic driving aids, differential technology was closer to what you would find on a farm tractor, the suspensions were prone to overheating, sluggish to respond, and the turbocharged powerbands were very narrow, high revving, with very average torque figures. Anti-lag measures involved mostly the use of LFB (left foot braking). In brief, driveability was very poor and necessitated a high skill level to reach the maximum potential of the vehicle.
Group B supercar drivers had to quickly heighten their level of anticipation to cope with the numerous performance increases of the cars such as the addition of aerodynamic aids which provided even more traction as higher speeds were reached. Even rally ace Walter Röhrl stated that finding the perfect balance between outright speed and pace was a challenge in itself. Yet, the drivers had to adapt in a very short amount of time to these much more powerful and very difficult to drive supercars. It was a pure blend of man (woman) and machine.
The rallies were also much longer than today’s, making going through them in such unforgiving machinery a true feat of physical and mental endurance. The Group B supercars really tested the will and courage of the drivers. Unlike today, the marketing potential of a person was not quite considered when teams signed up their drivers; it was a time when only their passion for the sport, their pure talents, and determination was in play. In one word: legends.
Detailed info on many drivers can be found by CLICKING HERE!
PS: The use of the masculine is not quite truly inclusive when talking about how “manly” the Group B drivers were. In fact, the Group B era also featured the best female rally driver to date: Michèle Mouton. The era also saw an earnest attempt by some manufacturers to attract women to the sport with various “Women Trophies (Trophé Féminin)” award opportunities.
All of Group B competition wouldn’t have happened without the rally teams themselves. For the first time in rally history, the most well funded teams employed an army of engineers and technicians to help develop cars for the sole purpose of winning rallies; they made use of the very best technologies, construction techniques, and wind tunnel testing – features that were previously reserved only for F1.
In the rally events themselves the action was no less frantic as each team could employ up to a hundred people; besides the drivers and co-drivers there were also engineers, spotters, mechanics, truck drivers, physical therapists, doctors, managers, publicists, public relations, and even helicopter pilots! The era saw the birth of mid-stage tire change “pit stops”, mechanics racing alongside a parallel route to meet with the rally cars in between stages, “flying mechanics” carrying spare parts in helicopters that would swoop down in the closest available space to rush and repair any broken-down cars, all the while managers were deciding on team orders and tactics. In Group B, the need to win superseded everything else and became the benchmark for modern rally team management.
Such excitement and publicity opportunities attracted car manufacturers from all over the world. In 1986, at the peak of the Golden Era, no less than ten were running cars in the top B/12 class, albeit with varied levels of financial and technical involvement. For 1987, this number was expected to be more than fifteen.
Detailed info on many works teams can be found by CLICKING HERE! (section under construction)
In Group B, the madness did not stop with just the cars. Did you know that Audi had once planned on using a similar method that the military uses to refuel planes in mid-flight? Indeed, for the lengthy Safari Rally in Africa, they started to devise a special plane whom would meet with the quattro in a straight and smooth section. The co-driver would extend a special perch to connect the fuel systems and refuel the car without stopping. I’m not sure how far they got into the idea but I’m sure that the FISA wouldn’t have allowed it for long!
The Group B competition era of the WRC turned out to be one of the most eventful and fierce consecutive years of rallying history. From almost crowning the first female world champion to stripping the title from another due to patriotic mischievousness and feudal internal politics – Group B competition had drama from start to finish to a level equal to its eventual fate.
A quick WRC competition summary (1982-1986) is available by CLICKING HERE!
Detailed event statistics can be found by CLICKING HERE!
Detailed event reports can be found by CLICKING HERE!
THE FALL OF GROUP B
The saying goes that “all good things must come to an end” but in Group B’s case a better saying would be “what is born in controversy will die in controversy”. Group B rallying would not escape this ominous fate. However, Group B’s demise cannot be attributed to a single factor, and there is much more to it than one may think. Let’s start with the most commonly accepted facts…
-THE SPECTATOR PROBLEM
“We all know that Europeans are crazy… for the motorsport of rally, that is! The passion Europeans show for the sport has no equal elsewhere. As such, it is of no coincidence that most international rally teams are based in Europe. Sadly, this level of popularity sometimes has negative impacts: you can’t imagine having people instead of curbs, ditches, or fences delimiting the road, right? Yet, it happened a lot in the Group B era! “
While the sport already had a growing popularity in the previous Group 4 days, the speed and fame of the new Group B supercars launched the world of rallying into a fan craze. While this success was good for publicity, it was less so for spectator safety. More and more unruly fans would line up the stages year after year, creating very hazardous situations that could lead to disaster. This problem was mostly seen in Portugal, Argentina, and to lesser extent other countries. While some blatantly dismissed the issue as something that Group B had no influence on, the increasing speeds of the cars could exponentially accentuate the problem out of proportions.
This was particularly true in Portugal where quite a good portion of the country’s population was in attendance as the crowds were estimated between 300,000 and 400,000 people. Hence, the “mass effect”, the closeness to the action, the feeling of freedom of movement, and the lack of proper crowd control gave too many opportunities for unruly spectators to do shenanigans. Dodging rally cars became a sort of a national pastime. The rally fandom in Portugal evolved into trying to touch the cars while they sped by. One who would achieve this feat would become some sort of hero to his peers. There were reports of Peugeot and Lancia service crews finding blood, hair, or severed fingers stuck in the wings and ducts of the cars while performing repairs. The legendary status of the Group B cars made any collision injury as a “badge of honour”, as was reported by the misplaced pride of a spectator whom had his leg broken by a speeding Walter Röhrl.
The rally drivers had reported many other spectator problems over the years; having rocks and snowballs thrown at their cars, fans purposely putting obstacles in the road or powdering a tarmac corner with snow, gravel or sand, possibly to try and induce a crash for the spectacle and/or to “help” the car back on the road. The event organisers pleaded that they just couldn’t control the entire length of a stage.
However, some would argue that they didn’t try hard enough! You can even say that the FISA was responsible for letting this happen: they could easily have forced the rally organisers to fix the problem with threats of cancelling the venues or other sanctions. They didn’t even try. Maybe because for a while the “fun” seemed harmless enough, but it was about to really get out of control. You just can’t imagine the emotional detachment the drivers must have had to drive flat out so close to people. The drivers certainly didn’t want this. In fact, they all hated it. Their complaints however fell on deaf ears. Even when the worse did eventually happen, no one listened.
In comparison, the famed RAC event in Great Britain was said to lure as much as two million people on the sidelines and three more million watching from home. One must however take into account that it was one of the longest stage rallies of the era while spanning almost half the country over a period of four days. The Brits would however show more restraint in their fandom.
-BLOOD, STEEL, AND SPEED
Up until 1985, the safety record of Group B cars had been decent with very few major incidents reported in all competition series. However, things would take a turn for the worst in the Tour de Corse rally. On the first day of the rally, May 2nd, at the first kilometre of the fourth special stage Zérubia – Santa Giulia, the Lancia 037 driven by Attilio Bettega took a right hand corner after the long straight, then entered into a tight left-hand corner. At the exit of the turn, Bettega skidded off the road into a ditch and hit a tree. The impact was so severe that the roof was partly torn from the Lancia. Co-driver Maurizio Perissinot did not suffer any injuries and went to flag down the following cars. Miki Biasion, Bernard Béguin, and François Chatriot stopped at the scene of the accident. The ambulance took 20 minutes to arrive, but even if the delay would have been shorter, the doctors later said that Bettega had died from the impact.
That event put the Group B cars’ safety under review by the FISA. It was determined that, even though the Lancia 037 was designed to be very lightweight, there was sufficient protection from the aluminium roll cage albeit it was weakest at its sides and front (exactly where Bettega’s car hit the tree). It was the FISA’s conclusion that not even a Group N car would have saved Bettega’s life in the circumstances. However, it seriously put in question the use of light alloy roll cages in rally cars. Ari Vatanen also badly crashed out of the same event but had walked away unscathed.
Three rallies later, ever fearless Vatanen had another major accident in Argentina while speeding down a long straight road in top gear when his 205 T16 flipped end-over-front over a jump, a design flaw and known issue at Peugeot, resulting in a severe crash. The flimsy composite exterior of the car shattered but the steel rollcage absorbed most of the hard impacts. The car crew was airlifted to the hospital by Peugeot’s own helicopter. Vatanen’s injuries were severe and deemed life-threatening; broken legs, ribs, and punctured lung. Thankfully, Vatanen would survive his injuries but that would be his last Group B drive in the WRC. His career would never return to the same level of success afterwards.
Crashes and occasional fatalities have been part of rallying (and motorsport in general) from its inception, and no amount of safety rules or regulations will ever void the risks entirely. These accidents were no different but the “innocence” of the world was also coming to an end…
By then, some drivers had already complained that the cars were becoming very hard to handle and that the performance level exceeded their abilities to counter the “tunnel vision syndrome” it created in some situations. Co-drivers had a tougher time keeping up with pace notes as gear changes and corners just came and gone too quickly. As such, most drivers had to heighten their level of anticipation to cope with the performance increases of the cars. They also had to adapt to the addition of aerodynamic aids which provided even more traction as higher speeds were reached. Even Walter Röhrl stated that finding the perfect balance between outright speed and pace was a challenge in itself.
The rallies were also very physically demanding for the drivers due to the increasing length of the events and the unforgiving nature of the cars. The crews often had to undergo physical therapy such as massages or spine decompression in between stages. These concerns did sway the British organisers of the famously enduring RAC rally to much shorten the 1986 edition and allow the drivers more rest periods, thus helping overall safety. This however displeased the purists.
-ACTION PLAGUED BY INACTION
In September of 1985, as Group B progressed into “madness for speed”, the FISA Technical Commission, then newly led by engineer Gabriele Cadringher, would amend some rules to “try” and improve safety. The revised 1986 regulations outlawed the use of aluminium roll cages for all future rally car homologations. Limitations on aerodynamic overhangs (i.e. spoilers) were imposed mainly in hopes to try and prevent higher corner speeds. There were however no provisions to otherwise limit the horsepower of the cars or raise their minimum weight. The main focus of the announcement was instead put on the draft of a new “Group S” category as a future replacement to Group B but left the latter largely open to its continuing excess for outright speed. The new class, which was specific to rallying, was expected to begin on January 1st 1988, after the “5-year stability clause” of Group B had expired.
Absolutely nothing was brought up about trying to enforce spectator safety at events or tending to the driver’s complaints of their increasingly demanding environment due to strong opposition against anything that could hurt the commercial aspects of the sport, most of it coming from the FISA’s own President, Jean-Marie Balestre and his right-hand man, Vice-President César Torres who also happened to be in charge of the overly chaotic Portugal Rally.
Many insiders of the time stated that if spectators had to be fatally struck then it most likely would happen at the Portugal Rally. History sadly proved them right when, at the very first day of the 1986 edition, local driver Joaquim Santos crashed his Ford RS200 into a massive crowd of people. Word of the accident took much delay to reach the officials, who kept the stage live for some time, all the while spectators frantically tried to wave down the following competitors – some even throwing rocks at them in anger. The emergency services were hampered by the ensuing chaos and overcrowded scene of the accident. The immediate aftermath of Santos’ crash left three people dead (a woman and two children) and injuring over thirty more with one of the injured said to have later died – (please disregard the count in this video):
It is still debated if Santos simply lost control of his machine at the wrong place or if he truly had spun out while trying to avoid spectators on the road as he and his co-driver Miguel Oliveira stated to the officials. It needs be mentioned that Santos was driving a much slower and dated Escort RS1800 before Ford offered him an upgrade to the RS200 – the Portugal event being his first WRC rally with the powerful supercar.
All insiders agreed on the fact that the constant coming and going from the sidelines to the road had made spectators bring sand and dirt onto the stage with their shoes, thus creating unpredictable patches of slippery surfaces that could have surprised any driver darting at the very limit of adhesion. However, due to the massive crowd, all preceding drivers had shown some kind of restraint when going through the stage – except Santos. Many therefore claim that the true cause of the crash was due to Santos’ inadequate training with the supercar and overzealous attempts at impressing his local crowd.
At the end of the day, all of the factory team drivers decided to “strike” and withdraw from the rally, signing a letter which was delivered to the officials. In this letter, the drivers stated that the spectators were responsible for the accident and that the blame should not be put on the drivers or the cars. This decision was not approved by most of the factory teams and the FISA officials on-site threatened their drivers with heavy sanctions if they did not immediately return to competition. The drivers would unite against this and would not obey as it was their hope to be able to force a change in the organisation of the events to prevent such accidents from happening again. After the event, Audi decided to retire from Group B competition unless the safety problems were fixed, putting even more pressure on the FISA to act.
However, this had done nothing to sway FISA president Jean-Marie Balestre: he wrote a letter to the Portugal Rally officials praising them for continuing the rally despite the driver strike, all without a single mention of the grave spectator problem in their event, and that he would personally deal at sanctioning the teams and drivers who had left. This was a defiant move to clearly show that HE was in charge and that the commercial aspects of the sport were paramount to anything else – even common sense.
Two rallies later at the Tour de Corse, on the second day of the event, May 2nd, at the seventh kilometre of the Corte–Taverna stage, driver Henri Toivonen and co-driver Sergio Cresto crashed their Lancia Delta S4 on a somewhat mundane left-hand corner. The car inexplicably left the road, rolled down the rocky embankment through some bushes, got hanged in some trees, and caught fire. The accident had no witnesses close enough to clearly see the event but some reported hearing an explosion and seeing a huge ball of fire and smoke shooting up from the treeline.
The two following drivers saw the smoke and radioed in for help to be sent. Contrary to Portugal, the Corsican officials reacted swiftly by immediately stopping the stage and dispatching emergency crews; the tight Corsican roads however impeding their progress to a fifteen minute delay on the scene. Upon their arrival, the Delta S4 was already but a charred and blackened mass of twisted metal. Toivonen and Cresto seemingly cruelly consumed by the flames while still strapped in their seats.
The FISA would but perform a summary investigation on the car itself. In the incident report would suggest that, although the true cause could not be effectively determined, the Delta S4 had veered to hit the small parapet and left the road – all without visible traces of brake or skid marks. In the ensuing tumble into the ditch and trees, something had made the fuel spill out and come into contact with a hot mechanical part that ignited it. The crew had little to no chance of escape.
Many contributing factors we also noted; such that the Delta S4 was running the thin, but homologated, petrol tank which was dangerously placed partly underneath the front seats, fully exposed to the elements by the team ‘s decision to remove the skid-plates to make the car lighter for increased performance. The fast-burning Kevlar bodywork of the car had provided extra fuel for the fire.
Ironically, Henri Toivonen was considered to be the only person truly able to tame the Delta S4 and exploit its full potential, as if the car had been designed for him. However, it must be noted that Toivonen reported that he was not feeling well the morning before the incident and showed some symptoms of flu to which he reportedly took some sort of medication. However, this did not prevent him from continuing to post fastest stage times and lead the rally by a large margin until the nefarious accident on the 18th stage. Toivonen had too much talent to be taken agape by such a mundane corner so one can only wonder if he had some sort of blackout just before the crash. This theory is fuelled by the rumours that Toivonen had a pre-existing condition due to a neck injury suffered from his crash at the 1985 Rally Costa Smeralda, albeit mechanical failure also cannot be ruled out.
-THE INFAMOUS BAN
Mere hours after the deaths of Toivonen and Cresto, FISA’s President Jean-Marie Balestre (whom coincidentally was present in Corsica) reportedly had a private meeting with Lancia-Martini team boss Cesare Fiorio. Balestre is said to have told Fiorio that “things can’t go on like this” and that “Group B has to stop”, to which Fiorio reportedly agreed with even though that meant the demise of his newly launched and quite successful Delta S4 rally car.
For Fiorio, the death of two of his drivers at the same event in yearly succession surely must have weighed heavily on his mind.
Shortly afterwards, Balestre and other Executive Committee members who also happened to be on site, organised a press conference and announced the immediate freeze on further “evolution” development of the rally cars, including an immediate ban on aerodynamic aids such as side skirts, and most importantly of the outright ban of Group B from competition for the end of the year. The category’s planned 1988 replacement, Group S, was also annulled on the spot.
This took everyone by surprise since Balestre had always been a strong defender of the commercial aspects of the sport without the slightest prior concern for safety. Right away, it was highly seen as a “political” decision to quickly appease the criticisms that the sport was now facing and quench the hysteria fuelled by the media. This unilateral decision outraged many rally insiders, including Peugeot Talbot Sport’s boss Jean Todt, claiming that the decision was rushed, without proper discussion with the rally teams, and without the two-year notice set in the regulations themselves.
However, in Balestre’s opinion, this clause could be disregarded when safety was in play. What is less known outside the closely-knit motorsport world is that Jean-Marie Balestre was a highly unpredictable and power-hungry person, often characterised by his peers with such terms as pompous, ignorant, impudent, snobby, hypocritical, and loutish, among other well-earned degoratories, so what Balestre actually meant is that he could do what he wanted. Balestre’s demeanour wasn’t helped by the fact that he also became FIA President earlier that year. His egocentric speech that barred the Toyota team from their well-earned winner’s spotlight at the Côte d’Ivoire Rally was a good example of his typical behaviour.
It was speculated that Balestre never liked the manufacturers’ involvement in the making of the new “lettered” regulations. He had supposedly only agreed to them because of the FISA-FOCA war to ensure the Federation’s financial survival. Afterwards, he directly blamed the manufacturers for purposely exploiting the regulations’ “loopholes” to create “fast and dangerous” cars thus making Group B “spiral out of control”. Hence, in his opinion, the manufacturers were the only ones to have blood on their hands.
Since, Group B had made rallying surpass Formula One in popularity across the globe and was now the leader in technological developments. These facts greatly displeased some very influential members of the Federation who felt that these were F1’s prerogatives. The infamous dispute in F1 was on the verge to being fully resolved, so they had no further need for Group B or for the manufacturers “meddling” in the rules. In brief, Balestre wanted to regain full control and kick the “undesirables” out from his playpen.
There was much unrest within the manufacturers, including the works drivers, so they all came to the FISA with pleas for another resolution to Group B’s unilateral ban. These talks were however seriously dashed when another deadly incident occurred at the ADAC Rallye Hessen, only a few weeks after Toivonen and Cresto’s deaths, when Formula One pilot Marc Surer crashed his Ford RS200 into a tree at high speed, unfortunately killing his co-driver Michel Wyder. Surer would remain in a coma for three weeks after the crash.
Similarly to the Santos incident, this was Surer’s first major outing with the Ford supercar, albeit his F1 experience made him a quite capable driver by default. However, this somewhat proved to Group B’s various detractors that the cars were blatantly dangerous. A quite graphic video of Surer’s crash is available HERE.
Yet, most of the BPICA members would fight on and presented the FISA with various plans to make use of the stillborn Group S category to save their multi-million investments. In October of 1986, in response to these proposals, a somewhat reluctant Balestre and the FISA Executive Committee created provisions to replace Group B with Group S but with a much revised and stricter set of regulations to truly control the speeds of the cars. The new Group S propositions, which were seen as keeping the high performance standards of Group B but in a much safer environment for both drivers and spectators, were then planned to take effect on January 1st 1987 – one year ahead of the original schedule.
However, mere days after this announcement, Balestre and his Committee went back on their decision and re-annulled Group S. In a sort of mea culpa, the FISA admitted to not have foreseen how fast Group B cars would become in just a few years and their utter failure to control the regulations which led manufacturers to exploit them: a mistake that they feared would repeat itself with Group S. That was the “official” story but insiders suspected that it was all a masquerade in the grand ballet of motorsport politics.
The 1987 Group A replacement formula was therefore made official again and this time without possibility of appeal. However the ban on the Group B cars would be limited to the B/12 and B/11 classes for cars who ran engines of more than 1600 cc (including with the 1.4 multiplier for forced induction). The lower displacement B/9 and B/10 cars were allowed to compete in their non-evolution form up until the expiration of their respective homologations. The “Golden Era” of rallying was unequivocally officially over.
For much more information about Group S history and details, please CLICK HERE!
This decision subsequently led Peugeot to pursue legal action against the Federation claiming that the bans would bring immense financial losses for the company. However, most argue that the real reason for the lawsuit was that Peugeot didn’t have anything close to a four-wheel drive Group A car and as such would no longer be able to favourably compete in the WRC. Nonetheless, the damages claimed by Peugeot were in the millions of dollars, money that the FISA didn’t want to lose in court.
Balestre thus saw an opportunity to strike a deal with Peugeot since the manufacturer had been disqualified by the local officials at the 1986 Sanremo rally – a decision that Peugeot had appealed. This disqualification had given the driver championship to Lancia’s Markku Alén in lieu of Peugeot’s Juha Kankkunen. The FISA subsequently decided to annul the results of the rally, thus stripping the title from Alén and giving it to Kankkunen instead, which officially gave Peugeot their second double title victory in a row. Insiders highly suspected that this was a decision to soothe the relation between the Federation and Peugeot, whom’s lawsuit had been ultimately rejected, and make them not appeal the ruling – it worked.
Here’s a very interesting Top Gear report of the Group B cancellation and proposed replacement Group S rules:
Crashes and occasional fatalities have always been part of rallying (and motorsport in general). In fact, even after the ban of Group B, Portugal still had its spectators problems up to 1988, and even though Group A cars were deemed much safer, the WRC experienced its historical peak in driver/co-driver deaths in the 1989 season with 5 fatalities in 3 months. Since Group A was not put back in question after these events, it is more weight for the argument that Group B’s ban was a purely political decision.
The wrong people were in charge at the wrong time and were plagued with inaction; i.e. not forcing rally organisers to enforce spectator safety and not revising the regulations to enforce a horsepower limit. The wrong men with the wrong politics killed the best era of rallying. Balestre’s case is quite paradoxical since, without him and his deciding role in the FISA-FOCA war, there might not have been Group B in rallying in the first place and as such rally fans do owe him a huge debt of gratitude.
AN INFLUENCE FOR THE FUTURE
The Group B rally supercars did not die out instantly with the FISA cancellation of the category. While the B/12 and B/11 classes were banned from official WRC competition and further evolution of these cars now outcast, the rules allowed the less powerful Group B cars designed directly from production models to continue competing. A few countries did however allow the top tier “silhouette” Group B supercars to roar along rally stages but this was mostly the case in Africa and Eastern Europe where the FISA had little control. Spain, since it allowed prototypes to be run in its events, was also a niche for the banned cars to compete.
One particular exemption from the FISA’s Group B ban was achieved by tough negotiations between Austin Rover Motorsport and Britain’s authorities to allow the MG Metro 6R4 in their national rally series. However, one requirement was that the power had to be reduced to 300 BHP, leading to the creation of the well-known “Clubman 300”. This version of the car still competes favourably in Britain to this very day.
-AUTOCROSS / SLALOM
The rising popularity of autocross / slalom events in Europe at the time led some more fortunate competitors to make use of Group B cars.
The Lancia Delta S4 in particular was said to excel in these types of events.
Many ex-works WRC cars were subsequently bought by privateers and “recycled” into European Rallycross where they enjoyed much success and cheers from the crowds until their phasing out at the end of 1992.
For detailed Group B era rallycross information, CLICK HERE!
Straight after Group B’s demise, some of the rally works cars got a final and ultimate “evolution” into hill climb monster machines, conquering the likes of Pikes Peak for the subsequent years. No one can forget the intense 1987 battle between Audi with its iconic Sport quattro Pikes Peak special and Peugeot with its fleet of three modified 205 Turbo 16s.
The “winning formula” of Group B directly influenced the next contenders at Peugeot with the 1988 405 Turbo 16 which set and held the record at Pikes Peak up until 1994. Group B design became the benchmark for all other future contenders. The last win of an actual Group B car at Pikes Peak dates back to 2004 when Stig Blomqvist won the event in a specially prepared Ford RS200E.
At the amateur and semi-pro levels, many Group B variants remain favourite platforms and are still highly competitive in various hill climb venues around the world.
For detailed post Group B hill climb evolutions information, CLICK HERE!
-ENDURANCE / RALLY RAID
The only other remaining niche for Group B cars with direct manufacturer involvement was in endurance rally raids such as the Paris-Dakar where variations of Group B cars competed favourably well into the 1990s.
This was especially the case for Peugeot’s 1983 “Turbo 16 design” which evolved from the 205, through the 405, and ultimately ended with the Citroën ZX. The “T16 design” outright won the Paris-Dakar event 8 times from 1987 through 1996, officially retiring in 1997 (not to mention winning the WRC in 1985 & 1986). This means that the “Group B formula” was engineering that came to be competitive for nearly 15 years: an achievement that is seldom seen in motorsport and a testament to Group B’s influence.
For detailed post Group B rally raid evolutions information, CLICK HERE !
In 1997, the FIA would officially revive the Group S idea with the WRC (World Rally Car) class. While a bit more strict on the rules (such as a higher minimum weight, smaller restrictor plates, and limitations on aerodynamic overhangs), it did give birth to high tech purpose built rally machines once again. The new WRC regulations stated that 20 “evolution” cars needed to be built (instead of 10 for Group S) but this time on an existing production chassis that was manufactured to at least 25,000 units. Technology had advanced so much in the previous 10 years that the sheer cost of the new WRC cars made Group B pale in comparison. In 2006 and 2010, million dollar machines paired with a bad economic context led the FIA to strangle the rules once more.
For 2017, with high technology now available at a cheaper cost, the FIA has announced the return of the electronic controls and more importantly a power gain up to 380 HP thanks to an increase in turbo restrictor size to 36 mm. The cars will also be allowed to implement 55 mm wider bodywork, greater overhangs, extra aerodynamic features such as canards, and shed 25 kg of weight. These new regulations bring the sport back closer to what Group B and Group S had started more than 30 years before.
However, it is worth to mention that FWD to AWD conversions are still sadly allowed for the WRC class which means that manufacturers do not have to build “true” turbo AWD road versions to be sold to the public. This lack of proper homologation has killed most sense of relating to the WRC cars for the pure-bred enthusiasts… and for those who dream of owning a “true” street version of their favourite WRC rally car! These “homologation specials” died with the end of Group B & A and were never truly seen again.
AN IMMORTAL LEGACY
-KIT CAR REPLICAS
As time passes, the nostalgia felt for the Group B cars is ever growing and not forgotten; the undying fame and mythical status have since prompted some companies to design kit cars to build your own replica of certain models.
While genuine Group B cars are too rare and expensive for the average enthusiast, replicas normally cost in a range of $/€ 10,000 for “do-it-yourselfers” and up to $/€ 100,000+ for professional shop builds.
Group B’s wild designs also helped influence car culture, the popularity of (all) four-wheel drive, and has drawn some people to spend incredible amounts of time (and often money) to build tribute or heavily-inspired cars in hopes to keep the spirit alive.
For other examples of such modern projects, CLICK HERE!
-RETRO, HISTORIC, VINTAGE RACING
Thanks to more recent softer rules, some competitors who still own Group B cars can now use them again in these special vintage/retro racing, rallycross, and hill climb events.
Some national rally series have also since relaxed the rules for their “Open” and vintage / historic classes which now allows use of Group B cars (and replicas thereof) in actual competitive rallies, although the cars have to run a turbo inlet restrictor which effectively chokes their power down to the 300~400 BHP range. This makes them hardly competitive versus the more modern and much easier to drive rally cars. However, it is a delight for the fans of the period.
To this day, genuine Group B rally cars with the actual power of their golden years can only be seen in non-competitive exhibition rallies such as the Eifel Rallye Festival or Rally Legend. Many owners are part of clubs such as Slowly Sideways or model specific groups to make it easier to find social gatherings and venues to display and run the cars. After all, genuine Group B vehicles are now priceless pieces of machinery very dear to the people that own them. In a way, even multiple decades later, they can be considered as “too fast to race”.
A FINAL THOUGHT
While Group B rally cars have since been surpassed in overall performance by their more modern counterparts, the era has nonetheless been a major pillar of what rallying is today and will always remain in the heart of the fans as the very pinnacle of the sport. While the era also had its share of detractors far too happy to see it gone, almost everyone involved in Group B has the same answer to the question “would you have done it again?”: a resounding “YES”. I am certain that even Henri Toivonen agrees from beyond. An unmistakable amount of passion and excitement that will never be seen again, including for yours truly – the sport had officially lost its innocence.
May the legendary 1980s Group B machines continue to live on in automobile museums, in vintage races, and in our minds. More importantly, may the exploits and sacrifice of the courageous drivers and co-drivers, imaginative engineers, hardy mechanics, and everyone involved in making what Group B was, shall they be remembered forever…
Rally Group B Shrine owner, chief editor, and author
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Riding Balls of Fire Group B The Wildest… (DVD/Blu-Ray/Download)
(C) Article by Jay Auger – website owner, main author & chief editor
- Images & videos are the property of their original owners.
- Eifel Rallye Festival Pictures used under permission – McKlein Publishing.
- Some videos courtesy of Duke Marketing Ltd.
SPECIAL THANKS & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
- John Davenport & Reinhard Klein – who’s invaluable Group B books help keep the story of Group B alive for the ages.
- Duke Marketing Ltd and Helmut Deimel Highspeed Films – for preserving the history of Group B on film.
- Peter Duke – for various insights on Group B’s audience demographics.